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Abstract
We examine the impact that subsidies paid to passive farmers have on the lease of land and
on the speed of land development. First, we nd that, even if delaying land development, paying
passive farmers increases the value of the land. Second, when bargaining for the lease of land, we
show that the agreement between the parties is conditional on an underlying development project
passing a threshold level in terms of protability. Third, we identify the conditions leading to
a Pareto improvement. Last, we illustrate our ndings by considering the establishment of an
energy crop on leased land.
keywords: Real Options, Land development, Passive Farming, Nash Bargaining.
jel classification: C61, Q15, R14.
1 Introduction
As a consequence of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) reform of 2003, or decoupling, EU farmers
are no longer required to produce agricultural commodities to receive direct payments (income
support) as long as they keep their farmland in Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition
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(GAEC). The reform was driven by the need to reduce the overproduction caused by production-
coupled payments (subsidies) as well as escalating environmental degradation associated with mod-
ern agriculture. Environmental stewardship has then been promoted and measures introduced to
ensure that agricultural land is kept in reserve for potential future use and land abandonment is
avoided (Phelps, 2007). This change in the basis for entitlement to support paved the way for
the development of passive farming, whereby a landowner manages their entire farm area to meet
the GAEC obligation without producing commodities (Brady et al., 2015). Currently, as much
as 20-30% of the agricultural area in some EU regions, primarily marginal regions, is managed
passively (Trubins, 2013). Within the industry the emergence of passive farming is perceived as a
bad thing because it is thought to be hindering agricultural development, since active farmers are
presumed to be denied access to land that could be used for farm expansion (LD, 2014, p. 112;
Wahlberg, 2014; Vernersson, 2012). In chorus the land managed by passive farmers is referred to
as being underutilized or blocked because it could, ostensibly, be used for producing commodi-
ties by expansion-willing active farmers (LRF, 2009). Thus from this perspective society is not
served by a land management payment: it benets passive farmers to the detriment of agricultural
development.
Indeed the SPS has resulted in more farmers remaining longer in the sector and thus slowing
structural change (Brady et al., 2012; Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen, 2010). However, the extent
to which the possibility for landowners to choose passive farming might be hindering agricultural
development is unclear. In an initial study Brady et al. (2015) show that passive farming occurs,
generally, because active farmers are not willing to meet landownersminimal rental price, as a
result of the inherently poor protability of commodity production on marginal land. Given the
SPS it is therefore rational for the landowner to manage their land passively rather than abandoning
it, thereby meeting a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) goal. Analysis, conducted in a static and
xed rental-price framework, though misses the implications for the decision dynamics of a land
management payment such as the SPS. In this paper we aim to evaluate the implications of the
SPS for agricultural development in a broader framework by considering the impact on land use
over time and under uncertainty about economic returns from land development (farming).
In particular we study the rental bargaining process leading to leasing of land as a¤ected by the
SPS and investigate how the optimal timing of development is a¤ected by the payment of subsidies
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and uncertainty about returns from farming.
The analysis is carried out using a real-options framework1. In particular, the model developed
in this article should be viewed in the context of the literature investigating the inter-temporal
allocation of land under uncertainty (e.g. Capozza and Li, 1994; Geltner et al., 1996; Schatzki,
2003; Isik and Yang, 2004) and the policy impact on agricultural investments in a stochastic and
dynamic frame (Feil et al., 2013).
In the model we reproduce the perceived blocking situation by considering the bargaining be-
tween a landowner and a potential lessee. The landowner is not willing to take initiatives in terms
of land development. However, he is able to meet the GAEC obligation and qualify for the subsidy
by undertaking some minimal but costly maintenance practices. This is the situation that we will
consider in the following as passive farming. In contrast, the potential lessee is willing to invest
and develop land for agricultural activities. If the land is cultivated, the GAEC obligation will be
automatically met and the subsidy paid. This is what we will consider as active farming. However,
due to uncertainty characterizing the returns from farming, land may, once leased, not necessarily
be immediately worth investment. If this is the case, the lessee may, by managing the land passively
in the meanwhile, qualify for the subsidy. As one can immediately see, we are basically viewing
the SPS as providing a minimal return on land not activated for production. This opportunity
enters our bargaining problem in two ways: rst, by raising the minimal amount of rent that the
landowner must be o¤ered and second, by reducing the cost of waiting before investing in the land
for the lessee.
We solve the problem in two steps. We rst determine the value and timing of a hypothetical
project to be developed on leased land. Then, we proceed to determining the optimal rental
payment resulting from a cooperative cake splitting game played by the involved parties. Our main
ndings are: rst, the SPS, as currently designed, accelerates the timing of land development. The
intuition is immediate. Paying a periodic subsidy to farmers investing on land lowers the investment
threshold, in terms of project value, in that it reduces the burden of the initial investment cost.
Second, in line with the current debate, when comparing the SPS with the hypothetical scheme
where no subsidy is paid to passive farmers, we show that land development is delayed under the
1See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a complete treatment of the theory of investment under uncertainty and
irreversibility.
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SPS. The insight behind this result is straightforward. Counting on the possibility to qualify for
the subsidy, even if managing land passively, the cost of waiting before investing is reduced and the
lessee may then postpone the initiative and undertake the investment when agricultural returns
reach higher levels. This makes the value associated with the land asset unambiguously higher.
This result should not be surprising considering that in the presence of a subsidy for passive farming
the object over which the parties are bargaining is a package containing two assets, that is, land
and the entitlement to receive a subsidy on that land even when managing it passively. Hence,
summing up, removing payments to passive farmers if, on the one hand, would denitely accelerate
land development it would, on the other hand, reduce the value of land as faster development
would preclude the consideration of more valuable future land uses. Third, paying a subsidy to
passive farmers introduces, by increasing the minimally acceptable rent, a threshold that rather
than deterring the lease of land is simply making it conditional on the possibility of undertaking
a development project paying su¢ ciently high prots to both parties. In the absence of this
opportunity, the bargaining fails. Fourth, by setting the rental payment in a cooperative setting,
the two parties are able to reach an agreement that makes both better o¤. This results from sharing
the value associated with land according to their respective bargaining powers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model
for the analysis of land development and determine the value attached to land and the timing of
development. In Section 3, we characterize the bargaining problem and determine the optimal
rental payment. We examine the resulting sharing rule and discuss the implications of our results
for land values and timing of development. In Section 4, we illustrate our ndings by using the
establishment of a willow stand as numerical example. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are available
in Appendix A.
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2 The Basic Model
Consider a landowner (S, hereafter) who owns a specic land parcel (say, 1 hectare) and a farmer
(D, hereafter) contemplating the lease of that land.2 Assume that S is currently keeping his3 land
idle and is not willing to convert it to any other potential alternative use.4 In contrast, D, once
leased land, she will consider its conversion to a protable land use. Assume that, in order to
initiate this project, she incurs the sunk investment cost K(> 0). For simplicity, assume that land
development is irreversible and denote by X the value associated with the new use.
Further assumptions are as follows:
Ass 1 A subsidy n > 0 is paid to the land manager (i.e., the single farmer payment) if the
land is either i) actively managed for production of commodities or ii) passively managed
without production, that is, it is kept idle but in Good Agricultural and Environmental Con-
dition (GAEC, hereafter). In order to meet this obligation, specic maintenance practices are
needed. Hence, accounting for a per-hectare cost of compliance, c, the net cash ow accruing
to a passive farmer, i.e., farmer under regime ii), is m = n  c  0.5
Ass 2 The project value, X, is a random variable evolving over time according to the following
di¤usion:
dXt=Xt = dt+ dWt; with X0 = X (1)
where  is the expected growth rate,  is the volatility parameter, and Wt is the increment
of the standard Wiener process satisfying E [dWt] = 0 and E

dW 2t

= dt.
Ass 3 S and D are risk-neutral agents and maximize the net present value of their expected future
cash ows. Both agents discount future cash ows using the interest rate r > .6
2For the sake of simplicity we assume that the contract duration is long enough to be reasonably approximated,
when discounting future cash ows, by an innite time horizon. Thus, in the following, considering (long-term)
leasing rather than land purchase does not a¤ect the quality of our results.
3S is male while D is female.
4This may be due to di¤erent reasons such as lack of interest in agricultural activities, the presence of a better
job option, the lack of the needed skills and abilities, etc.
5We implicitly assume that the farmer would never apply for a subsidy paying n < c.
6Convergence of the model requires the trend in the project value, Xt, not to exceed the discount rate. Note in fact
that if r  ; investing would never be optimal for D. Last, note that in order to use an interest rate incorporating a
5
2.1 Idle land and potential development: timing and value
We start by considering landowner S. Suppose that he may be willing to lease his land in exchange
for a per-period rent p. The present value of the ow of future rental payments is then equal to:7
P = p=r (2)
Farmer D, conditional on having leased the land parcel from S at time t = 0, can be viewed as
holding the option to invest, by spending the amount K, in a development project worth Xt. At
the generic time period t > 0 the value of this option is
O(Xt;X
i) =
8<: Et[e r( t)(Xi  K)] for 0 < Xt < XiXt  K for Xi  Xt
 (3)
where  = infft  0 j Xt = Xig is the optimal investment (stopping) time and Xi is the threshold,
expressed in terms of the projects value, triggering investment.
Now, consider the initial time t = 0 and assume that X0 = X lies within the continuation
region, i.e., 0 < X < X i, that is, the range of values where the option to invest is kept open.
Hence, the expected net present value attached to holding the right to develop the land is equal to8
V (X;Xi) =
m[1  E0[e r ]] + nE0[e r ]  p
r
+O(X;Xi)
=
n  fc[1  (X=Xi)] + pg
r
+ (X=Xi)(Xi  K) (4)
where  > 1 is the positive root of the equation 	() = 0:52(   1) +    r = 0.
In Eq. (4), the rst term is the expected present value of the ow of periodic subsidy payments
n net of the maintenance cost c and the rental payment p due to S. Note that c must be deducted
only up to time  since, once the land has been developed, farmer D qualies for the subsidy on
the basis of its productive agricultural activity. In the rst term, this is accounted for by using
the stochastic annuity term, discount factor (1 E0[e r ])=r = [1  (X=Xi)]=r. The second term
proper risk adjustment, expectations should be taken with respect to a distribution of Xt adjusted for risk neutrality.
See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details.
7Note that committing to pay p forever is equivalent to a one-shot payment P . This implies that, as mentioned
above, our analysis may perfectly apply to a frame where one considers a purchase rather than a lease.
8See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 315-316) for the calculation of these expected present values.
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in Eq. (4) represents the expected net present value of the development project, that is, the net
project payo¤, Xi  K, discounted by using the stochastic discount factor E0[e r ] = (X=Xi).9
In order to identify the optimal investment timing strategy, we solve the following problem:
F (X;Xi) = max
Xi
V (X;Xi) (5)
We nd:10
Proposition 1 Provided that rK > c,11 the optimal investment threshold and value function are:
Xi = (1 +
1
   1)(K  
n m
r
) = (1 +
1
   1)(K  
c
r
) (6)
and
F (X;Xi) =
n  (c+ p)
r
+ (X=Xi)[Xi   (K   c
r
)] (7)
Studying the threshold Xi we notice that:12
i) at the investment time, the project value, Xi, must be higher than the total development
cost K net of the present value of maintenance costs, c. Note in fact that, once the land has been
developed, production automatically qualies land as being kept in GAEC. In particular, Xi must
cover at least [1 + 1=(   1)] times the net development cost where the term, 1=(   1), represents
the correction needed in order to account for the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility in the
investment decision problem;
ii) the higher the volatility of the project value, the higher the threshold set for investing since
@X i=@ > 0, which in expected terms implies that the investment is delayed;
9 In our frame we abstract from the consideration, once the project has been undertaken, of a potential temporary
or permanent suspension of the operations. These opportunities will make even more valuable the possibility of
qualifying for a subsidy when managing land passively since the lessee may rely on the subsidy when operations are
temporarily or permanently stopped. The simplication comes at minimal cost in terms of generality for our results
and these options may, if sensible, be easily incorporated in our frame. In this respect, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
on the value of the options to mothball, reactivate and abandon an investment project.
10These results follow from the rst-order condition of the maximization problem (5). See Dixit et al. (1999) for
further details.
11Note that we will abstract from the consideration of the case where rK  c. In this case, in fact, the option to
invest should be immediately exercised, i.e., Xi  0. The assumption is realistic considering, when compared to the
rental cost of capital, the usually relatively low cost of compliance.
12On the comparative statics relative to the parameters  and  see Appendix A.1.
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iii) the higher the rate at which the project value grows, the higher the threshold set for investing
since @X i=@ > 0, which in expected terms implies that the investment is delayed;
iv) the higher the cost for meeting the GAEC obligation through passive management, the lower
the investment threshold since @X i=@c < 0, which in expected terms implies that the investment
is anticipated. In other words, the higher c, the lower the net payment m or, in nancial terms,
the "dividend" paid for keeping the option to invest open. This in turn makes it less desirable to
postpone the exercise of the option. Thus, it is worth stressing it, the timing of land development
does not depend on the subsidy n per se but rather on the cost incurred for qualifying for the
subsidy when land is managed passively.
v) the investment trigger is not a¤ected by the rental payment, p. This makes sense considering
that the rent must be paid irrespective of how the lessee may want to use the leased land, i.e.,
keeping it idle rather than developing it.
Last, in Eq. (7), the rst term represents the value associated with holding the option to develop
forever, that is, the present value of the ow of subsidies n net of the compliance cost c and the
rental payment p. The second term is the expected present value13 of the net value attached to
the development project, i.e., Xi minus the development cost, K; plus the amount, c=r, which is
implicitly saved, as explained above, once land is developed.
3 The optimal rental payment
Lets now focus on the bargaining process leading to the leasing of the land parcel on the basis of
a mutually convenient agreement. Denote by ta the time at which the agreement is reached and
assume that Xta = X. At ta, conditional on having reached an agreement, the parties obtain the
following payo¤s:
WD(p;X;Xi) = F (X;Xi) and WS(p) = P
The agreement must make both parties better o¤. This implies that the following conditions must
hold:
1.
WD(p;X;Xi) = F (X;Xi)  0 (Condition 1)
13The net pay-o¤ (X + n
r
)  (K + m
r
) is discounted using the stochastic discount factor E0[e r ] = ( XX )
 .
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or, once rearranged,
(X=Xi)(Xi  K)  P   n  c[1  (X=X
i)]
r
(7.1)
that is, the value of the option to invest must be higher than its actual cost. Such cost is
given by the present value of the rent, P = p=r, minus the net present value of the benets
associated to the claim on the subsidy n;
2.
WS(p) = P  m=r (Condition 2)
or
p  m (7.2)
that is, the per-period rent p cannot be lower than the net payment m = n c that landowner
S would receive by not leasing his land parcel and managing it passively.
3.1 Cooperative solution
Assume that D and S are engaged in a cooperative cake-splitting game where the two parties have
bargaining power  and 1   with  2 (0; 1), respectively.14 As well known, the underlying game
can be solved by applying the Nash bargaining solution concept (Nash, 1950; Harsany, 1977).
A feasible Nash bargaining solution, p  0, solves the following maximization problem:
max
p0

 =  ln[WD(p;X;Xi)] + (1   ) ln[WS(p)] (8)
s.t. WD  0 and WS  m=r
We nd:
Proposition 2 In a cooperative bargaining setting, the optimal rental payment is:
p = (1   )fm+ (X=Xi)[r(Xi  K)  c)]g (8.1)
14Note that our frame may easily apply to the analysis of a Nash bargaining game where the two parties are
characterized in terms of aversion to the risk of internal conict. It would in fact su¢ ce to set the Nash product equal
to (WD)p(WS)q; where 0 < p  1 and 0 < q  1 measure the level of risk aversion for each of the parties involved.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
Note that by setting the rental payment p the payo¤s accruing to the parties are
WD(p;X;Xi) =  fn  c
r
+ (X=Xi)[Xi   (K   c
r
)]g  0 (8.2)
WS(p) = (1   )fn  c
r
+ (X=Xi)[Xi   (K   c
r
)]g (8.3)
that is, D and S are splitting in parts proportional to their bargaining power the total value one
may attach to the land asset, i.e.,
W (X;Xi) = F (X;Xi) + P =
n  c
r
+ (X=Xi)[Xi   (K   c
r
)]
=
m
r
+ (X=Xi) [(Xi +
n
r
)  (K + m
r
)] (8.4)
The rst term in Eq. (8.4) represents the value that land would secure if passively farmed while
the second stands for the value associated with a potential land development project.
As one can immediately see, Condition 1 is always satised. In contrast, Condition 2 requires
that
W (X;Xi)  [1=(1   )](m=r) (8.5)
That is, the total value of the asset must be higher than 1=(1    ) times the present value of the
ow of net payments, m=r, that one would obtain by not leasing land and managing it passively. If
this is the case, a feasible agreement can be reached, otherwise the bargaining fails. In this respect,
note that
Proposition 3 For any nite W (X;Xi), the bargaining fails for any  >  where  solves the
equation W (X;Xi) = [1=(1   )](m=r):
Proof. Note that for  ! 1 the term [1=(1    )](m=r) in inequality (8.5) tends to innity while
it tends to m=r for  ! 0. This implies that for any nite W (X;Xi) there exist a threshold value
 such that W (X;Xi) = [1=(1   )](m=r).
3.2 Non-cooperative solution
By considering the limit cases  ! 0 and  !  , we can use Eq. (8.1), together with Proposition 3,
to illustrate the outcome of a non-cooperative Stackelberg game. This may serve as a frame for cases
where for instance i) intense competition among many potential lessees results in higher bargaining
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power for the landowner or ii) highly fragmented agricultural land and few active neighboring
farmers may give more power to the potential lessee due to lack of competition.
In a vertical relationship where the lessee has no bargaining power, i.e.,  ! 0, we have
lim
 !0
p = rW (X;Xi); lim
 !0
WD(p;X;Xi) = 0; lim
 !0
WS(p) =W (X;Xi). (9.1-9.3)
In this case, the landowner may actually appropriate the entire value of the potential investment
project.
In contrast, inverting the roles in the vertical structure, i.e.,  !  , we nd
lim
 ! 
p = m; lim
 ! 
WD(p;X;Xi) =W (X;Xi)  (m=r); lim
 ! 
WS(p) = (m=r): (9.4-9.6)
In this case, the landowner earns exactly the minimal amount that makes him indi¤erent be-
tween signing or not signing the lease contract, i.e., m=r, while the lessee gets the residual value
W (X;Xi)  (m=r).
3.3 Timing and value: comparative statics and discussion
In this section we examine the impact that the SPS has on the timing and on the value of land
development. Lets rst focus on investment timing. We take as the benchmark the investment
threshold that one would have in the absence of a subsidy policy, that is
X
i
= (1 +
1
   1)K: (10)
As can easily be seen, the presence of the SPS speeds up, in expected terms, land development as
Xi = X
i   (1 + 1
   1)
n m
r
< X
i
for any c > 0: (10.1)
The acceleration depends on the second term, (1 + 1 1)
n m
r ; where, as explained above, the
wedge, (1 + 1 1), is the correction needed in order to account for the presence of uncertainty and
irreversibility in the investment decision to be taken. The term n mr is crucial for the magnitude
of the acceleration. In this respect we note that
lim
m!nX
i = (1 +
1
   1)K = X
i
; (10.2)
lim
m!0
Xi = X
i   (1 + 1
   1)
n
r
= Xim=0 < Xi: (10.3)
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The limit result (10.2) may very well approximate the case where compliance costs are very low,
i.e., c! 0. In this case, irrespective of the actual regime, i.e., active rather than passive, the farmer
obtains the same payment. Hence, not surprisingly, the investment timing is not dependent on the
subsidy paid and the SPS has no impact on the speed of land development. The limit (10.3) may
instead represent i) the case where compliance cost are high i.e., c! n; or ii) the case where, in line
with the current debate, a passive farmer does not qualify for the SPS, i.e., m = 0. In these cases,
the investment threshold is the lowest possible and the highest degree of potential acceleration is
reached. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The ow of subsidy n paid to an active
farmer reduces the burden of the investment cost K and consequently lowers the threshold level
at which investment should be undertaken. This e¤ect, however, tends to vanish as m tends to n:
This is due to the fact that cashing the periodic net transfer m, as a sort of dividend conditional
on holding the option to invest, makes postponing the investment decision less costly.
Last, by changing perspective, one may also view 0 < m < n as the partial extent up to which
the subsidy is capitalized in the minimal rental payment to which S is entitled. It follows that for
m ! n the subsidy is fully internalized and the positive e¤ect of a subsidy n for speeding up the
investment is killed. So, at least for what concerns the timing of land development, the payment
granted to passive farming has a negative e¤ect. However, in order to draw any conclusion, it is
worth examining the impact that the SPS, as currently designed, has on the value associated with
future land use.
Studying the impact of m on the value accruing to the parties, i.e., WD(p) and WS(p); and
on condition (8.5), we nd that
Proposition 4 i) the total project value W (X;Xi), and consequently the value accruing to the
parties, is increasing in the level of m;
ii) as m increases, the set of potential investment projects supporting an agreement shrinks.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3 has important implications. First, the value of land is increasing in the level
of m, i.e., @W (X;Xi)=@m = [1   (X=Xi)]=r > 0. The result can be illustrated on the basis of
the following argument: in the presence of a (net) subsidy m paid to passive farmers, the lessee
postpones the investment, this in turn allows investing for higher project values Xi. The negative
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e¤ect of postponing the investment, however, prevails on the higher investment value and the net
negative e¤ect is represented by the term  (X=Xi) in the derivative. This net loss is however
balanced by the positive "dividend" m paid when waiting before investment.
Concerning condition (8.5), the presence of a subsidy m paid to passive farmers should not
be seen as deterring the possibility of reaching an agreement but rather as imposing a stricter
"selection" on the potential projects that could be developed. In other words, only projects paying,
in expected terms, a su¢ ciently high reward may give rise to an agreement. Otherwise, parties are
better o¤ keeping land idle. The intuition is straightforward. Consider the extreme case where the
value of any investment opportunity is null, then why should the landowner give up the certain
amount m=r and getting in exchange, by leasing her land, a share (1    ) of the same amount?
Obviously it would not make any sense. Hence, the chance of having a deal are strictly dependent
on the value attached to the implicit share (1  ) of the investments net value that the landowner
may claim through the rent. Thus, summing up, a higher m reduces the chances of having land
leased but has a positive e¤ect on the value that the parties may get whenever a deal is reached.
Studying the impact of  on condition (8.5), we nd that
Proposition 5 As  increase, the set of potential investment projects supporting an agreement
shrinks.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This result implies that, ceteris paribus, investment projects characterized by a su¢ ciently low
 may more likely meet condition (8.5). Note that since @=@ < 0 and @=@2 < 0, these
are the projects characterized by a high growth rate and/or a high volatility rate. Back to the
considerations relative to the waiting time, these are, however, given a certain X and considering
the e¤ect of  on the investment threshold (@X i=@ < 0), projects for which a longer waiting time
is expected.
Last, commenting on the possibility of modifying the current SPS in order to exclude pas-
sive farming, we can conclude that, on the basis of our ndings, this would denitely accelerate
land development but at a cost in terms of land value since faster development will preclude the
consideration of more valuable future land uses.
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4 Numerical Illustration
In the following we illustrate our ndings considering a short rotation coppice willow plantation
as potential project to be developed on leased land. We calibrate this exercise using as input the
data and parameters values used by Di Corato et al. (2013) to examine the establishment of a
new willow stand in Central East Sweden.15 It is worth stressing that the scope here is merely
illustrative and that by no means we intend to reach any conclusion concerning the considered
investment opportunity.
4.1 Parameters
We consider a 1 hectare willow stand. Annual revenue and operational costs are set equal to SEK
6450.84 and SEK 4432, respectively. The total establishment cost is equal to SEK 12155. The
40% of these costs is however covered by a subsidy granted to farmers investing in energy forestry.
Thus, the actual establishment cost paid by the farmer amounts to SEK 7293. Note that, in line
with the assumed project innite horizon, it follows that:16
X =
SEK 6450:84
r    and K = SEK 7293 +
SEK 4432
r
The single farmer payment, n, is set equal to SEK 2000 per hectare while the cost of compliance,
c, is equal to SEK 650 per hectare (HS, 2012). It follows that net cash ow accruing to a passive
farmer, m, is equal to SEK 1350. We discount17 future pay-o¤s using 4% as risk-free interest rate
and, in order to examine the impact of the drift and volatility characterizing the project value, X,
we let  and  take values f1%; 2%; 3%g and f10%; 20%; 30%g, respectively. Last, we will consider,
15Note that all gures in Di Corato et al. (2013) consider 2009 as reference year. Note also the periodic revenue
and operational costs are set per year computing the equivalent annuity for an assumed project lifetime of 22 years
and 8.1 odt/yr/ha as a reference in terms of yield. See Di Corato et al. (2013) for further details.
16Note that one may equivalently consider X as the net project value, i.e., the expected present value of the ow
of annual revenues minus operational costs, and set K equal to the establishment cost.
17We are implicitly assuming that the agents are risk-neutral. Note that, however, one may easily account for a
di¤erent level of risk aversion by adding a risk premium to the risk-free rate.
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as base case, a scenario where the parties have equal bargaining power, i.e.,  = 1   = 50%.
Table 1. Development project: parameters values.
4.2 Numerical analysis
Lets now, in line with the gures summarized in Table 1, determine the current value, X, of the
considered project (See table 2). This value will then be compared with the investment thresholds
in order to determine if investment should be undertaken immediately or if it should be delayed.
Variations in the projects values are due to the positive e¤ect that a higher growth rate  has
on the present value of the revenue ow. Hence, a project value which is expected to grow at a
3% annual rate has a present value equal to SEK 645084 while for  = 1% this value decreases by
two-thirds.
Table 2. Development project: current values on the basis of di¤erent trend levels.
In table 3, in order to examine the impact of paying a subsidy to passive farmers, we include both
the investment thresholds Xi and Xim=0 . We then isolate (in bold), given the current project
values, the combinations where investment should be delayed, i.e., X < Xi (or Xim=0) . We notice
that the investment thresholds are, irrespective of whether a subsidy is paid or not to a passive
farmer, increasing in the drift and the volatility characterizing the project value. This e¤ect is
in line with ndings in the real option literature where the investor responds to higher growth
and volatility in the underlying project value by delaying the investment choice. In line with our
ndings (see inequality (9)), in the presence of a subsidy paid to passive farmers, investment should
15
be, in expected terms, always be postponed if compared to the case where no subsidy is paid. This
is due, as explained above, to the lower convenience, in terms of gains in actually cashed subsidies,
i.e., n m, of switching from passive farming to active farming. As illustrated in table 3, given the
current project values, paying a subsidy to passive farmers does not play a role when the project
is characterized by low volatility ( = 10%). Note in fact that for any  the option to invest is
always abundantly in the money. This is not the case for higher volatility levels. For  = 20% and
any , paying passive farmers induces a delay in the investment for projects that would, otherwise,
be immediately undertaken. This is also the case for  = 30% and  = 3% while for  = 30%
and  = 1% or  = 2% the option to invest is, irrespective of whether a subsidy is paid or not to
passive farmers, out of the money. A further delay in the exercise is, however, associated to the
presence of subsidy to passive farmers.
Table 3. Critical investment thresholds: sensitivity analysis for the impact of ,  and r.
In table 4, in order to assess the positive impact that the presence of a subsidy for passive farming
has on the value of land and consequently on the value shares accruing to the parties involved in
the transaction, we compare, evaluating them at the same period, i.e., t : X = Xim=0 , the expected
present value of the leased land in the absence of this subsidy, that is
W (Xim=0) = Xim=0 +
n
r
 K
with the expected present value of leased land when this subsidy is paid, that is,
W (Xim=0 ; X i) =
m
r
+ (Xim=0=Xi)[(Xi +
n
r
)  (K + m
r
)]
This allows isolating the e¤ect of further delay in the investment accompanied by payment ofm over
the time period before investment. The comparison is based on the ratioW (Xim=0 ; X i)=W (Xim=0).
We note thatW (Xim=0 ; X i) is higher thanW (Xim=0) for any  and . The interval illustrating the
gap indicates, in terms of additional value, a 1:278% (combination  = 3% and  = 30%) as lowest
16
extreme and a 25:572% as highest one (combination  = 1% and  = 10%). We also note that the
% gap is, unambiguously, decreasing in both  and . The intuition is straightforward. Note in
fact that, for the parameter values considered, the impact on the value of land of a higher project
value Xi (accruing when investing) is lower once discounting for the expected time one needs to
wait before investing. This negative e¤ect becomes, as illustrated by the investment thresholds in
table 3, higher and higher as  and/or  increase. This implicit cost of waiting is, however, lowered
by the presence of a periodic payment m. Hence, summing up for both e¤ect, we can still associate
a higher total value to land when passive farmers are paid a subsidy.
Table 4. Value functions: sensitivity analysis for the impact of  and .
Table 5 presents the rental payment, p, which should be o¤ered to S for leasing his land and the
ratio between this value and the net payment, m, that is, the amount that S would earn by refusing
the proposal. As one can immediately note, a deal set on a cooperative basis will reward S by an
amount which is, even in the worst scenario (combination  = 1% and  = 10%), more than twice
the amount that he would receive by not leasing his land and holding on passive farming. The same
gure is, irrespective of the volatility level, more than 8 times higher when  = 3%. The absolute
rental payments and the wedge are computed considering a deal signed on the basis of the current
project values (see table 2). Both measures are increasing in both  and . This reects the higher
value of land, i.e., W (X;Xi), resulting from i) a project undertaken when higher threshold values,
Xi, are reached and ii) the presence of a payment m; accruing when waiting before investing,
which balances the e¤ect of discounting for a delayed investment time. Finally, note that, since
 = 50%, the parties are equally sharing the value attached with leased land, W (X;Xi), and p
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represents also the expected annuity corresponding to the position held by D.
Table 5. Optimal rental payment and ratio p=m: sensitivity analysis for the impact of  and .
Last, in order to illustrate the role played by the bargaining power in the set-up of a successful
transaction, we provide in table 6 the level for the bargaining power associated with S, i.e., 1   ,
to which would correspond a p = m. It follows that an agreement cannot be reached for any level
of 1  below the ones indicated in the table. In this respect, we observe that the highest threshold
value is 22.96934% (combination  = 1% and  = 10%) which is, of course, well below the 50%
assumed in our base scenario. Interestingly, this threshold value decreases with both  and/or .
The e¤ect can be explained on the basis of the same arguments used above for commenting the
impact of these two parameters on p. Last, it is worth highlighting that the threshold value for the
minimal bargaining power needed to sustain a deal between the two parties reaches extremely low
levels for  = 3%. This in turn implies that even in the presence of a quite unbalanced distribution
of the bargaining power a successful deal may be reached.
Table 6. Bargaining power: sensitivity analysis for the impact of  and .
5 Conclusion
Passive farming, whereby an agricultural land owner keeps their entire farm area in good agricul-
tural and environmental conditionwithout producing any commodities, has emerged in the EU
as a consequence of the decoupling of agricultural policy payments from production in 2005 in the
form of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). It is feared, particularly by the farming lobby, that
passive farming is hindering agricultural development (specically investments in land to produce
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food), and thereby denying welfare-enhancing opportunities to development-willing active farmers
(potential lessees of passively farmed land). It has been shown that passive farming results from
the landowner and potential lessee failing to come to a rental agreement rather than the SPS per
se (Brady et al., 2015). This raises the question as to whether the parties, and ultimately society,
are made better or worse o¤ as a consequence of the SPS. To answer this broader question we have
studied the rental bargaining process using a real-options framework.
We make three major ndings. First, we show that the SPS accelerates the timing of land
development if compared to the case where this support is not provided. Then, in order to isolate
the impact of subsidies paid to passive farmers, we consider a hypothetical scheme where no subsidy
is paid to passive farmers. This allows showing that land development accelerates if passive farming
does not qualify for support. In fact, including passive farming, by making waiting less costly,
encourages postponing the investment decision favouring projects having a higher current value
and hence better future prospects than those currently available. This corresponds to part of the
intent of the SPS, that is, to keep open the option to use land in the future. This option has a value
to society by securing the allocation of land to more valuable development projects. So, if the issue
is the speed of development, paying a subsidy to passive farmers induces some delay compared to
the case (hypothetical) where they would not receive it. However, the value of the land asset is
unambiguously higher. Consequently, even if the sector loses some speed in development it gains
in value.
Second, when bargaining for the lease of land, the presence of the SPS makes the agreement
between the parties conditional on a development project passing a threshold level in terms of
expected protability. Thus rather than blocking access to land it makes leasing the land for
development conditional on a su¢ ciently good development project being available. That is a
project that has a su¢ ciently high expected payo¤ to both parties given the underlying project
risk.
Third, cooperative bargaining results in an agreement that makes both parties better o¤, which
can be seen in contrast to the argument that the SPS is blocking land and thereby reducing
opportunities for active farmers. As we show though, the distribution of benets between the two
parties will depend on their relative bargaining power. Intense competition among many potential
lessees should result in the land owner extracting most of the rent. On the other hand in regions
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with fragmented agricultural land and few active farms within practical distance to the land, the
potential lessee should have the power to extract most rent due to lack of competition. This
result concurs with what is observed in reality, in highly productive arable regions (e.g., the plains
of Scania in southern Sweden) rents are high and passive farming is not observed, on the other
hand in regions with low productivity and fragmented arable land (e.g., the mixed farming-forestry
regions in southern Sweden) rents are low and passive farming frequent.
Consequently rather than reducing welfare the SPS benets both parties by:
i) maintaining the option to develop land in the future if current market returns are too low given
the risk of development,
ii) increasing the value of land,
iii) making both parties better o¤ nancially in the event of a realized rental agreement.
Finally, this paper has focused on the impacts of a land management subsidy on land use from
a private-economic or development perspective. The EUs management subsidy in the form of the
SPS is however motivated in terms of the provisioning of public goods that are assumed to boost
social utility. As shown here, paying people to keep land in good agricultural condition allows for a
potentially better use of the land in the future. Keeping land in good environmental condition on
the other hand is intended to provide conservation of biodiversity and a range of ecosystem services
through landscape management, particularly those related to cultural and recreational values (Van
Zanten et al., 2014). While good agricultural condition should be fairly straightforward to dene and
control it is hardly the case for environmental values which will depend on the actual management
measures performed in a particular spatial context (Ekroos et al., 2016). That is, it is unlikely that
a general land management condition will optimize environmental values across a spatially and
socially diverse EU. This is of course a fundamental challenge for the CAP as highlighted by the
problem of even evaluating the e¢ ciency of agri-environmental schemes (Kleijn et al., 2006). It is
therefore not surprising that the environmental utility of decoupled payments is severely doubted
(Peer et al., 2014). This raises the crucial question as to whether the environmental value of
agricultural land would change if it is managed through passive farming as compared to using the
land in commodity production. To inform a broader evaluation of the impacts of the SPS on social
20
welfare in the EU, there is a need for ecological research to empirically investigate the environmental
implications of passive management.
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A Appendix
A.1 Investment threshold: comparative statics
Lets study the e¤ect of the parameters  and  on Xi = (1+ 1 1)(K  cr ). It is easy to show that
@=@ < 0 and @=@2 < 0. Hence, it immediately follows that:
@X i=@ =  ( 1
   1)
2 @
@
(K   c
r
) > 0; (A.1.1)
@X i=@2 =  ( 1
   1)
2 @
@2
(K   c
r
) > 0: (A.1.2)
A.2 Optimal rental payment
The rst-order condition for the maximization problem (8) is:18
@

@p

p=p
=  1
r
 
WD(p;X;Xi)
  1   
WS(p)
= 0 (A.2.1)
From Eq. (A.2.1) we obtain
P  =
p
r
= (1   )fn  c
r
+ (X=Xi) [Xi   (K   c
r
)]g (A.2.2)
A.3 Bargaining and project value: comparative statics
Condition (8.3) - Lets now study the impact of m on the condition (8.3). We rst dene the
function
H(m;X;Xi) = W (X;Xi)  1
1   
m
r
= [
X
=(   1) ]
 (K +
m n
r )
1 
   1  
 
1   
m
r
(A.3.1)
Note that if no transfer is paid to passive farmers, we have
H(0;X;Xim=0) = (X=Xim=0) [(Xim=0 +
n
r
) K] > 0 (A.3.1.1)
This implies that an agreement can always be reached if m = 0.
Taking the derivative of H(m;X) with respect to m; we obtain
Hm(m;X;X
i) =  [(X=Xi) +  
1   ](1=r) < 0 (A.3.2)
18As one can easily check, the second-order condition holds always.
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This implies that as m increases, Condition (8.3) becomes, ceteris paribus, stricter and then may
not hold.
By taking the derivative of H(m;X;Xi) with respect to  we have
dH(m;X;Xi)=d = ln[X=Xi](X=Xi)[Xi   (K   c
r
)] < 0 (A.3.3)
This implies that as  increases, Condition (8.3) becomes, ceteris paribus, stricter and then may
not hold.
Project value - The rst derivative of W (X;Xi) with respect to m is:
Wm(X;X
i) = [1  (X=Xi)]=r  0 for 0 < X  Xi (A.3.4)
This implies that the higher is m the higher is the total value associated to the asset, W (X;Xi),
and then the value accruing to both parties, i.e., WD and WS .
Last, from Eq. (A.3.1) follows that
dW (X;Xi)=d = dH(m;X;Xi)=d = ln[X=Xi](X=Xi) [Xi   (K   c
r
)] < 0 (A.3.5)
This implies that as  increases, the total value associated to the asset, W (X;Xi), lowers.
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